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A Multilevel Theory of Secession 
1. Introduction 
Secession, i.e. the voluntary withdrawal of a political territory from a larger one in which it was 
previously incorporated, is not a frequent phenomenon. This is not surprising. All polities have 
an interest in their territorial stability across time. What I mean by polities are ensembles of 
relatively autonomous government institutions exercising coercive power over a specific 
population and territory. Polities include independent states, autonomous territories at sub-state 
level, self-governing municipalities as well as supranational unions of states such as the 
European Union (EU). Democratic polities are those whose citizens freely elect their 
governments and hold them accountable. If the borders of political territories were not stable 
over time, democratic governments could not fulfil their most basic tasks of providing security to 
their citizens and resolving conflicts among them, let alone represent them in decisions that have 
long-term consequences. Moreover, frequent changes of borders would entangle governments in 
endless conflicts with those of neighbouring territories.  
However, territorial borders do change occasionally. They did so quite frequently before 
the consolidation of the current international system when empires expanded through 
colonisation and territorial annexations or when rulers agreed to transfers of territory. They 
changed again when empires released their colonies into independence or when states broke up 
due to regime collapse or civil war. They can change also through voluntary (re)unification when 
neighbouring territories decide to merge into a larger one. In this paper, I will generally set aside 
all these scenarios and will be concerned only with secession, i.e. a voluntary breakaway of a 
polity from a territory of which it had previously been a part.  
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Explanatory as well as normative secession theories are mostly level-specific because 
they apply only to independent states without considering secession at other levels. This is the 
case for the most advanced explanatory theory developed by Philip Roeder (2005). It is also the 
case for ‘remedial-right-only’ normative theories (Buchanan 1991, 1997, Buchanan 2004; Patten 
2014; Stilz 2011, 2015) that have not tried to understand why within-state secessions and exit 
rights from regional unions are more often accepted than those from independent states. Liberal 
nationalist theories (Gans 1979; Miller, 1976; Moore, 2015; Nielsen, 1998; Philpott, 1995; Tamir 
1993) aim to enhance the matching of national and political boundaries and might also apply to 
within-state secessions of linguistically and culturally distinct territories, such as the secession of 
Jura from canton Berne in the 1970s. They are also likely to defend unilateral secession rights 
from unions consisting of distinct nation-states, but have little to say about the redrawing of 
municipal borders. By contrast, associative-plebiscitarian theories (Beran 1984, 1989; Gauthier 
1994; Pogge 1992; Steiner 1998; Wellman 1995, Wellman 2005) do not privilege any particular 
type of polity and are level-neutral – their criterion of legitimacy is always the same: democratic 
majority support in a secession referendum is sufficient provided the same right is granted to any 
territorial group that wants to break away from the post-secession territory. The empirical puzzle 
for all these theories is why in real-world democracies secession is handled so differently at 
different territorial levels.  
This paper presents a normative secession theory that is neither level-neutral, nor level-
specific, but rather level-differentiated. The scope of analysis is limited to secession in stable 
democratic contexts. In section 2, I introduce a multilevel perspective that frames secession as a 
change of status or affiliation of a territory within a wider constellation of territorial polities. 
Section 3 defends a general democratic presumption against secession on grounds of territorial 
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stability, democratic diversity and mutual recognition. Section 4 links different levels of 
permissiveness for secession to different citizenship regimes and democratic purposes of local, 
federated, independent and supra-state polities. Section 5 considers how substantive conditions 
for legitimate secession vary across levels and section 6 does the same for procedural conditions 
of recognition. The conclusions summarise the innovative elements of the argument and point 
towards a hypothetical future in which territory may become less salient. 
 
2. Territorial Constellations and Status Changes 
Secession conceptually involves a candidate polity that aims to break away and a parent polity 
that it aims to break away from. Monolevel theories of secession consider only one type of 
parent polity as relevant: independent states. They frame secession as involving a claim for 
independent statehood raised by a candidate group and directed at the government of the state 
whose citizens and residents the members of the group currently are. The candidate group is 
variously thought of as an ascriptive (ethnic, linguistic, racial, religious) minority, as a stateless 
nation or as a group of dissenting citizens who want to live under a different government without 
having to emigrate. These theories assume that minorities, nations or dissenting groups must be 
territorially concentrated in order to effectively raise a claim to secession. Territory figures 
mostly as an instrumental resource control over which enables oppressed or dissatisfied groups 
to threaten with secession in order to either get central governments to meet their demands or to 
actually break apart the state. Alternatively, territory is also sometimes considered as the core 
object of rights claims raised by secessionists. The political nature of the territory that these 
candidate groups occupy prior to secession is, however, rarely relevant for monolevel theories. 
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By contrast, in a multilevel perspective, secession is understood as a move to change the 
status or affiliation of a territory within a wider constellation of polities. What I mean by a 
constellation is an ensemble of distinct polities that are jointly involved in determining the 
political status of individuals or of a territory (Bauböck 2010). Complex constellations, such as 
federal states or the EU, do not only include horizontal relations (between territorial polities that 
enjoy equal legal status, as independent states or the provinces of a federation do) but also 
vertical relations between several levels of territorially nested polities. The present paper extends 
the constellations perspective, which I have previously used for analysing individual border 
crossings and citizenship transitions, to territorial border shifting. The two phenomena are 
sometimes compared with each other, when secession is described as the migration of borders 
over people. From a constellation perspective, it is more appropriate to imagine secession as the 
migration of a polity to a new territorial level. It is thus a specific instance of the broader 
phenomenon of territorial rescaling, “which refers to the migration of functional systems, 
identities, and institutions to new levels” (Keating 2013, p. 22).  
As I will discuss in section 6, secession within a multilevel constellation involves four 
types of recognition claims: internal recognition by the citizens of the candidate polity and three 
forms of external recognition: parental recognition by the parent polity, vertical recognition by a 
higher-level encompassing polity and horizontal recognition by other polities in the constellation 
whose status secessionists aspire for. For each secession claim we need to consider which are the 
polities that are addressed or affected. For example, when examining secession of a province 
from a state, the relevant constellation will include the parent state, the other provinces of that 
state and the international community of states from which the secessionists expect recognition. 
By contrast, when secession changes the boundaries between provinces inside a state, the 
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relevant constellation will generally not include third countries. A constellations perspective is 
not only useful for empirical analyses of secession dynamics, but also essential for normative 
evaluation. Whatever the motives of secessionists are, they claim a right to change the status or 
affiliation of a political territory. Such a claim needs to be assessed by considering how it would 
affect the self-government rights of all the territories involved in the relevant constellation and 
whether it deserves to be recognised by them.  
In order to understand secession as an (attempted) move within a constellation of 
territorial polities, we need to assume that these polities are otherwise stable. The dissolution of 
the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia created a context for the formation of new states that is quite 
different from that of Scottish or Catalan secession attempts. Brexit would also look very 
different if it happened in a context where the EU itself were in a process of dissolution. A 
constellations perspective considers secession as a move by one player (in response to other 
players’ moves) rather than as an entirely fresh start of the game. Presupposing otherwise 
territorially stable democratic polities reduces the number of empirical cases dramatically with 
regard to international secessions, which have mostly occurred in the context of break-ups of 
autocratically ruled multinational states or postcolonial independence (Roeder 2007, pp.5-9).1 
This condition is, however, much less constraining for sub-state secessions that are not 
infrequent in democratic states. In any case, in order to analyse the democratic legitimacy of 
secession, we need to assume not only that the polities in the constellation are governed 
democratically, but also that the constellation itself is relatively stable.    
                                                          
1 There is a second reason for distinguishing cases of democratic secession from those of postcolonial 
independence. Unlike the former, the latter involves a normatively well-supported primary right to self-
determination that is also recognized in international law. There are mixed cases, such as the claim for 
independence of New Caledonia from France. In such contexts, the substantive and procedural principles 




Relations between polities in a stable constellation are of two basic kinds. They are 
vertically nested if the territory and citizenry of a polity is included in an encompassing one, as is 
the case for municipalities and provinces within states and for member states in a union of states. 
Or they are horizontally distinct if the polities enjoy equal status and their territory and citizenry 
are generally separate from each other, as is the case for independent states within the 
international state system.2 Within each of these basic types, we need to distinguish two 
subtypes. Vertical relations are either constitutive or non-constitutive. I will argue in the next 
section that relations between federal and federated polities, and between member states and 
unions are constitutive, whereas those between municipalities and the encompassing state or 
between provinces and a union of states are non-constitutive. Horizontal relations between 
polities are either embedded or disembedded. The former is the case if all polities are included in 
an encompassing one, as in intra-state relations between municipalities and provinces and intra-
union relations between member states, whereas relations are disembedded if there is no such 
encompassing polity, as in international relations between states, or in the relations of 
municipalities and provinces to similar polities in other states. The point of making these 
conceptual distinctions is that they become normatively relevant when assessing conditions for 
legitimate secession.  
Although most normative theories frame secession as exit from a parent territory, this 
does not adequately describe the goals and outcomes of secession in multilevel constellations. 
There are three kinds of changes that secession can (aim to) bring about. The first and most 
                                                          
2 Depending on how polities determine their citizenry, however, this does not exclude partial overlaps. In 
the international system, individuals retain their citizenship of origin when residing in the territory of 
another polity and increasing numbers are even dual citizens. 
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important one consists in upgrading a territory on a vertical scale within a nested constellation.3 
This happens when a part of a metropolitan region wants to form a separate municipality with its 
own local government, when a large city or a contiguous group of municipalities wants to 
separate from the surrounding region by forming a new province, and when an autonomous 
region or province wants to break away from the state by becoming an independent country.  
The second type of change consists in a horizontal realignment4 of a territory that secedes 
in order to join a neighbouring one while retaining its status on the vertical scale. The June 2017 
decision of the Swiss municipality Moutier to leave the canton Berne and join the canton Jura 
provides a recent illustration. The same kind of horizontal transfer happens in the international 
arena when an irredentist province secedes from one state in order to join a neighbouring one.5 
Realignment moves can be split into two steps: a secession and a unification move. In order to 
reduce complexity, I have already set aside territorial unifications and therefore do not further 
consider realignments either. 
Finally, the third type of secession involves exiting without upgrading or realignment. 
Such pure exit means that a territory is no longer included in a larger one and that its post-
secession status does not depend on recognition by other polities. This applies in practice only to 
states leaving a territorial union of states, such as the EU.6 In spite of the claims of Brexit-
                                                          
3 According to Philip Roeder, ‘new nation-states have mostly come from administrative upgrade of 
segment-states’ (Roeder 2007: 11). I extend this idea here to within-state secessions. 
4 The notion of population or territorial transfers is generally used to refer to top-down arrangements that 
are neither initiated, nor desired by the population concerned, which is why I use the more neutral term of 
territorial realignment. 
5 Cases in recent history are extremely rare. The annexation of Crimea by Russia does not qualify as it 
was carried out by military intervention. A plebiscite held ex post under such conditions cannot confer 
legitimacy to a forceful territorial transfer.  
6 As I am interested here in territorial secession, I do not discuss state withdrawal from international 
organisations (IOs). Unlike IOs, the EU has a common citizenship and a territory in which it exercises 
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supporters that Britain will regain sovereignty, Brexit will not lead to any upgrading because the 
UK was internationally recognised as an independent state while an EU member and will 
continue to enjoy this status after leaving the EU. Brexit does not involve territorial realignment 
either since there is no other union of a similar kind that Britain could join. Among the three 
secession moves, exit from a union of states is therefore the only case that can be compared to 
individuals leaving a voluntary association: their legal and moral status as autonomous persons 
does not change and they are free to join other associations or not do so. The world of territorial 
polities is generally not structured like this. In this world territories can change status and be 
realigned, but can never fully opt out. Only if states themselves form a territorial union amongst 
each other is there a possibility of exit without upgrading and realignment. 
 
3. Democratic Constraints on Secession 
The above observation suggests a basic flaw of plebiscitary secession theories: they consider all 
democratic polities as voluntary territorial associations of citizens and defend a primary right to 
secession as an exit right. If this view were correct, then the same permissive rules for secession 
ought to apply to democratic polities at all levels and independently of the constellations in 
which they are embedded. In this section I discuss three reasons for a general democratic 
presumption against a primary right of unilateral secession: territorial stability, democratic 
diversity and external recognition. In the following sections I will then show that the strength of 
the presumption varies across territorial levels. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
rather comprehensive jurisdiction. Other regional unions, especially those in South America, are 
gradually evolving towards regional polities with a common citizenship.  
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Those who advocate more generous rights of territorial self-determination complain that 
international law and authors defending remedial-only secession rights are biased towards the 
status quo in a way that is morally objectionable (e.g. Walker 2017, p.38). The first part of this 
argument is correct. All established territorial polities are biased towards their self-preservation. 
Such a preservationist bias is, however, justifiable from a democratic perspective since the 
democratic legitimacy of collectively binding decisions that affect future members and residents 
in a territory depends on rough continuity of the territorial borders and composition of the 
citizenry.  
Some proponents of a plebiscitarian right to secession respond that present borders are 
widely considered to be unjust and permitting iterative plebiscites on unilateral secessions would 
lead to a series of changes resulting in political borders that are both just and stable (Pogge 1992; 
Wellman 2005). The latter assumption seems far-fetched, since it underestimates the 
instrumental use of secession threats as a minority veto (Buchanan 1998: 21) and presupposes 
that people have stable preferences with regard to territorial units of which they want to be 
citizens without knowing in advance what the borders of these units will be after a whole series 
of secessions.  
The second democratic objection against a primary right to secession challenges the idea 
that borders would be just if democratically chosen. It rejects the underlying ideals of political 
communities as either homogenous nations or voluntary associations. Both are at odds with 
accepting diversity as a background condition for democracy.  
As I have argued elsewhere, an internal diversity of interests, identities and ideas about 
the common good belongs to the circumstances that make democracy empirically possible and 
normatively necessary (Bauböck 2017: 7-8). Diversity can be undermined in two ways: through 
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government coercion that oppresses, expels or assimilates minorities; or through citizens sorting 
themselves into more homogenous polities via migration or secession. Of these two sorting 
mechanisms, only voluntary migration is fully compatible with principles of liberal democracy 
and it mostly results in more rather than less diversity. If people can move freely across political 
borders, they do not tend to sort themselves into more homogenous territorial units but seek 
instead opportunities or protection for themselves and make their territories of destination more 
diverse as a result. This is not the case where territories are divided either top down or through 
democratic referendums in order to resolve conflicts over identities and interests by creating 
more homogenous polities. 
Liberal nationalists such as David Miller defend the view that territorial sorting through 
unilateral secession can be overall beneficial for building stable democracies if it produces 
nation-states that are better able to support a shared public culture and national identity than 
multinational states (Miller 2000, pp. 110-124). Yet the purpose of creating a shared culture and 
identity through territorial separation from an existing polity conflicts with fully accepting 
diversity as a background condition for liberal democracy. Miller’s argument relies on the 
untested assumption that democracy can and must accommodate a diversity of religious and 
ethnic identities and ways of life but cannot accommodate a diversity of national identities and 
nation-building projects unless these share a sufficiently strong encompassing national identity. 
This argument does not only cast doubts on the stability of multinational democratic states, such 
as Canada, Spain, the UK, Belgium and India, but also on the project of building democratic 
unions of states like the EU. Even if we accept the dire empirical prognosis, the problem remains 
that, once population transfers are ruled out, creating new polities on the basis of national 
majority identities also creates new alienated minorities and thus reproduces the original problem 
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of how to build a public culture and identity that can be shared by all citizens. Moreover, if 
redrawing territorial borders succeeds in reducing national diversity within polities it will also 
enhance perceived national differences between them and may thus threaten peaceful and 
friendly international cooperation.  
Associative plebiscitarian theories, while not being committed to nationalism, propose a 
principle that would have an even more radically homogenising effect: “The reiterated use of the 
majority principle to settle disputes about political borders … maximizes the number of 
individuals who live in mutually desired political association, an ideal implicit in the right of 
freedom of association” (Beran 1989: 39; see also Gauthier 1994: 360). The problem with this 
view is that it blurs the distinction between civil society, which is the realm of free association, 
and political society, which is not. Territorial polities are coercive rather than voluntary 
associations, whose democratic legitimacy does not emerge from individual consent to 
membership but from opportunities of contestation and democratic authorisation of governments 
by free and equal citizens. True, individuals must be free to leave, but this does not imply the 
freedom to change the shape of the polity itself by breaking away a part of its territory.  
The alternative view to a nationalist sorting of heterogenous identities into more 
homogenous ones and the libertarian dream of people sorting themselves into like-minded 
political communities is to regard diversity as a background condition, rather than an obstacle for 
democracy. The fact that people are thrown together through accidents of birth in a territory 
whose borders have been shaped by history instead of their own choices, is not to be regretted in 
this view. Democracy is a system of political rule that can be justified towards such people 
because it treats them as free and equal citizens who jointly authorise a government that has 
coercive powers to resolve their conflicts and pursue their common interests.  
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Moreover, preserving and affirming a persistent diversity of interests, identities and ideas 
requires constitutional democracy rather than simple majoritarian decision-making. A voluntary 
association of like-minded people can be internally democratic in the sense of having a 
governing board that represents its members and is accountable to them, but it does not need a 
constitutional democracy whose government is constrained by checks and balances and the rule 
of law. Constitutional democracy in turn preserves individual liberties and minority rights 
against majority tyranny.7  
The third democratic constraint on secession is a requirement of recognition within the 
relevant constellation. As I will argue in section 6, only for candidacy recognition is there a strict 
requirement of actual support. For the three types of external recognition introduced in section 2, 
the normative condition is not that other polities must actually recognise a secession claim, but 
that they ought to do so because the claim is ‘recognition-worthy’. While being worthy of 
external recognition is a condition for the legitimacy of secession, achieving actual recognition is 
a fundamental interest of the citizens of a newly created polity. Without recognition by other 
polities, a seceding territory would become an outcast or ‘liminal polity’ (Krasniqi 2018, in this 
issue) – similar to a stateless person in a world where the rights of individuals depend on states 
recognising them as citizens of a particular country.  
Secessionists assume that they have a moral claim to vertical or horizontal recognition by 
virtue of a unilateral right to self-determination. For example, Catalan and Scottish separatists 
want post-secession states to be immediately recognised as new member states of the EU and 
also of the UN. Their opponents claim that secession has to be recognised first of all by the 
                                                          
7 The view that plurinational diversity is a favourable condition for liberal democracy was defended by 
Lord Acton in his rebuttal of John Stuart Mill’s nationality principle (Acton 1907). 
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parent polity and that this presupposes either a constitutional right or legislative permission to 
hold a secession referendum in the candidate territory or alternatively approval by a majority of 
voters throughout the parent territory. Both of these stances are insensitive to level-specific 
conditions for recognition. As I will discuss below, normative conditions for recognition vary 
strongly across levels. Here I emphasise the general point that a requirement of external 
recognition contradicts claims to unilateral self-determination by framing the legitimacy of 
secession in relational terms.8 Secession is morally legitimate only if the other polities in the 
constellation are obliged to recognise an upgrading or realignment claim for a particular territory.  
The territorial stability, democratic diversity and recognition requirements all highlight 
why the analogy with voluntary association is inappropriate when assessing the normative 
legitimacy of territorial secession. But these constraints create only a general and defeasible 
presumption in favour of existing borders. After all, it is theoretically possible that redrawing 
them might enhance stability, preserve diversity and result in mutual recognition between the 
newly created polity and the others in the constellation. In order to arrive at more determinate 
answers to the question of when secession is legitimate we need to examine the properties of 
democratic polities at different levels and their relations to each other. 
 
4. Democratic Purposes of Citizenship and Self-government at Different Levels 
In this section I provide a normative argument for a multilevel framework by examining the 
specific democratic purposes of polities at different territorial levels. I derive this argument from 
a theory of multilevel citizenship that I have elaborated elsewhere (Bauböck 2017). I suggest 
                                                          
8 See also Keating (2013, p. 175), who similarly defines territorial autonomy as “a relational concept, so 
that 
all polities are self-governing but interdependent.” 
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there that individuals’ claims to be recognised as citizens of a specific polity depend not only on 
the strength of their ties to it, but also on the conditions under which this polity can govern itself. 
These conditions differ fundamentally for polities that occupy different rungs on the vertical 
scale within nested constellations. I propose that (1) at the local level, all residents are local 
citizens and should also enjoy voting rights in local elections; (2) at the independent state level, 
citizenship is attributed at birth and presumptively retained for life rather than being 
automatically acquired and lost on the basis of residence; (3) citizenship in self-governing 
regions (of a federal state or regions enjoying special autonomy status) is derived from 
citizenship of the wider state and activated through residence in the region; (4) the same 
principle of derivative citizenship activated through residence applies to unions of independent 
states, such as the EU, with the difference that here citizenship in the encompassing polity is 
derived from that of the constituent member states.  
The normative argument backing these level-differentiated principles for determining 
citizenship is that different types of polities and citizenship regimes realise different democratic 
purposes. The local level of government in democratic states provides public goods and services 
to residents in polities with completely open borders. The territorial integration of states has torn 
down the walls around cities and abolished privileges of local ancestry and birth. It has thereby 
created an open space in which mobility does not affect one’s citizenship status and rights. All 
sufficiently large democratic states have, however, retained local powers of self-government. 
The combination of these two features of local democracy – open borders and self-government – 
realises an important democratic purpose: it turns co-residents into equal citizens without 
distinguishing between natives and foreigners. This is not only a value for the local community; 
since the whole state territory is subdivided into self-governing municipalities, an inclusive 
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residence-based citizenship exists throughout the national territory and provides a first and basic 
layer of democratic citizenship.  
Citizenship in independent states is regulated by very different principles. It is based on 
acquisition by birth (through descent from citizens or birth in the national territory) and life-long 
membership by default. Immigrants who want to become citizens have to reside in the territory 
for longer than in the local community and they do not become citizens automatically but have to 
apply for naturalisation. The converse rule exists for renunciation of citizenship by emigrants, 
who can give up their citizenship only after taking up residence abroad and filing a request. This 
regime may look more exclusionary than automatic ius domicilii at local level, but this depends 
entirely on what the conditions for naturalisation are. Moreover, life-long birthright citizenship 
provides migrants with a secure external citizenship and right to return to their country of origin, 
which they would lose if their citizenship depended on residence.  
The democratic purpose that is sustained by these rules for national citizenship is, first, 
the long-term stability and transgenerational continuity of the citizenry. This is important when 
citizens are asked to take into account the interests of future generations who will be members of 
the same polity. Second, birthright and life-long citizenship stabilises also the responsibility of 
independent states for their citizens in a way that protects the interests and rights of individuals 
who move across borders in the absence of an encompassing polity. Democratic states readmit 
their citizens from abroad, they provide them with diplomatic protection and most involve them 
also as absentee voters in national elections, none of which would be compatible with a system 
of purely residence-based citizenship in a world of nation-states that control their borders. 
The third way of determining citizenship status is by derivation. The citizens of 
California are those US citizens that reside in the Golden State. And the citizens of the EU are 
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the nationals of the member states. In the vertical hierarchy of nested polities, citizenship is 
derived downwards in the first case and upwards in the second one. However, it is always 
derived from the same level: independent state citizenship determines who is a citizen of a sub-
state province as well as of a supra-state union. Both local and regional citizenship at sub- and 
supra-state levels complement the weightier status and more comprehensive rights of national 
citizenship. However, local citizenship is structurally disconnected from national citizenship, 
whereas regional citizenships below and above the state level are structurally connected to it.  
There is again an important democratic purpose that is articulated and supported by such 
derivative citizenship regimes: (federal) union. Most large-scale democratic states have a 
regional layer of self-government in between the local and national ones. In federal states, this 
layer is involved in a constitutive relation with the larger polity that combines regional autonomy 
with power-sharing in the federal government (Elazar 1987, Stjepanovic and Tierny, in this 
issue). Federal democracy keeps a check on majority tyranny, because it adds a vertical division 
of powers between federal and federated polities to the separation between branches of 
government (Madison 1982). The common feature that distinguishes these arrangements from 
those of local self-government is that they are constructed as unions of autonomous polities that 
could potentially be independent from each other but are bound together by a commitment to 
share a common destiny and to govern jointly. Understood in this way, sub-state regional self-
government, be it through a federal constitution or a special autonomy status for offshore islands 
or regions with a culturally distinct majority population, is also a response to John Stuart Mill’s 




Derivative citizenship effectively means that regional citizens enjoy territorial autonomy 
because they are also citizens of the larger polity and are thus bound to respect the territorial 
integrity of the state as long as it preserves their collective autonomy. Similarly, it signals to the 
citizens of a union that they enjoy their rights of free movement because they are citizens of a 
member state and should thus support their state’s membership and contributions to the union.  
The specific purpose realised by a union of states that is not a federation but a 
‘demoicracy’ is that is allows states to better serve their citizens by ‘governing together but not 
as one’ (Nicolaidis 2013, Cheneval and Schimmelfennig 2013). Different from the provinces of a 
federation, the member states of a union retain their fundamental status as independent members 
of the international state system, but at the same time create a common legal order and 
government institutions in order to preserve the conditions for peace among, and democracy 
within the member states, and to enable them to address problems that would overwhelm them if 
they had to resolve them separately.  
The upshot of the argument in this section is that the rules for determining citizenship at 
the four territorial levels realise simultaneously and in a complementary way the democratic 
purposes of inclusive membership for co-residents in mobile societies, of transgenerational 
continuity of the citizenry and secure lifelong citizenship for international migrants, of regional 
autonomy within and of pooled sovereignty across states. It is impossible to pursue and combine 
these purposes at the national level alone. A mono-level conception of democracy is deeply 
flawed for this reason.  
 
5. Substantive Legitimacy Tests: territorial integrity and democratic purposes 
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I will now consider conditions under which the different secession moves discussed in section 2 
could be considered legitimate from the perspective of multilevel democracy outlined in section 
4. I will again focus on the characteristics of territorial self-government at each level in order to 
consider whether the encompassing polity is constituted as a voluntary association, whether its 
democratic purposes justify restrictive or permissive rules on secession and what constraints 
emerge from the secessionists’ need for recognition. These questions provide us with a sequence 
of three legitimacy tests: a voluntary association test establishing whether or not there is a 
primary right to secession, a democratic purpose tests clarifying what substantive grounds must 
be invoked as reasons for secession if there is no primary right, and various recognition tests 
specifying procedural requirements for legitimate secession. I will discuss substantive tests in 
this section and procedural recognition tests in the next. 
My argument will deliberately blend empirical facts with normative principles. We have 
now arrived at a level of contextuality where normative theory cannot remain purely deductive. 
Already my previous discussion of general principles of multilevel self-government was heavily 
informed by the evolution of democratic polities towards their present features. However, this 
argument was still decontextualised in the sense that it aimed at principles that apply to all 
contemporary democracies. Once we consider how democracies should respond to secession 
claims we need to consider also the particular constellations within which they are embedded and 
their position therein, and these are not the same everywhere. Not all democratic states are, or 
have to be, members of a supranational union; not all are plurinational in the sense of having 
been shaped by the historic co-presence of several nation-building projects in their territory, etc. 
At this level of analysis it is appropriate to consider also how international law or democratic 
constitutions, courts and governments have responded to secession claims. The task of normative 
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theory is then to go back and forth between principles and practices until we reach a reflective 
equilibrium.9  
I have claimed that all polities have an interest in their territorial integrity. Whether this 
interest is strong enough to rule out a unilateral right to secession depends on the constitution of 
the polity, and specifically the relation between an encompassing polity and the nested polities 
within its territory. Where the relation is a confederal one or a union of independent states, the 
encompassing polity has been constructed as a voluntary association, each of whose members 
has freely joined and remains free to leave. The citizens of the union may have an interest in 
preserving the territorial integrity of the larger polity, but they cannot prevent any of its 
constituent parts from opting for exit without destroying the constitution that binds them 
together. The EU is a polity of this kind. Its nature as a voluntary association of states emerges 
from the rules for accession of new member states (Art. 49 TEU). Even before the insertion of 
Art. 50 on withdrawal from the Union in the Lisbon Treaty, it was generally understood that 
member states were free to exit. What this latter article does is to establish a procedure for 
leaving the EU. In normative terms, it affirms an already implicit right to secede, but makes its 
exercise conditional on a readiness to negotiate fair terms of separation. This imposes reciprocal 
obligations on the EU to offer such fair terms instead of deliberately punishing the citizens of a 
withdrawing state and on the government of the withdrawing state to seek an agreement instead 
of pulling out without a deal.  
Federal states are fundamentally different from confederations and demoicratic unions in 
this respect. A federation has, first, a consolidated territory instead of a procedure for 
enlargement that establishes a right to join for qualifying countries subject to agreement by the 
                                                          
9 This use of ‘reflective equilibrium’ differs somewhat from John Rawls’ conception (1971, pp.48-51), 




present member states (Lacey and Bauböck 2017).10 Second, the purpose of a democratic 
federation is to bind together self-governing polities that could potentially be independent states 
into a common polity that is itself an independent state.  
We can describe the moral compact that sustains federal cohesion as a double 
conditionality of territorial self-government: As long as the federal government respects the self-
government rights of the constituent polities, the latter are bound to respect the territorial 
integrity of the federation. Conversely, if the federal government violates systematically the 
autonomy of constituent polities and there are no alternative constitutional remedies for restoring 
it, these polities have a right to threaten with secession. Ideally, federal constitutions specify 
these rights fairly because they have emerged from a unanimous consensus among constituent 
polities. Ideally, federal courts will be neutral arbiters in conflicts between central and federated 
governments over the interpretation of these rights. And, ideally, federal constitutions will be 
open for renegotiation when they are no longer sufficiently supported by all polities in the 
federation (Tully 2001). Under non-ideal conditions, constitutional documents and courts will 
often fail to protect the self-government rights of federated polities adequately.  
The proper normative approach to secession in such cases is thus a remedial-right only 
conception, with a specification of the relevant grievance as the violation of territorial self-
government rights. What counts as an alternative remedy depends on the nature of the 
secessionists’ grievances but also on the nature of the regime in power. If a territorial minority 
has suffered persistent suppression by a non-democratic regime, its leaders may have good 
reasons not to trust remedial autonomy offers. If, however, there is a change towards a 
                                                          
10 The territorial expansion of the US federation was not a procedure of voluntary association, but of 
colonisation and eventual upgrading of territories into states. Puerto Rico might eventually become the 
51st state, but this option emerges from its current non-self governing status that is not compatible with 
the US constitution.   
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democratic regime and they are invited to negotiate a new constitution, past grievances alone 
cannot justify secession. The secession of Kosovo from Serbia illustrates the former scenario, the 
Spanish transition to democracy after Franco’s death the latter. 11  
I am not taking sides here in the debate over whether such a remedial right to secession 
ought to be formally enshrined in the constitutions of federal states alongside the primary rights 
to territorial self-government. The debate on constitutionalising secession rights has focused on 
the consequentialist question of whether doing so is likely to enhance or undermine federal 
cohesion (see e.g., Norman 2002; Sunstein, 2001; Weinstock 2001). My claim is a normative one 
that the constituent polities of federal states have a moral right to secede if and only if their rights 
to self-government are violated in a way that destroys the federal nature of the constitution. One 
might object that such a remedial secession right may still infringe on the rights of the remaining 
constituent members of the federation that are worse off after secession. However, if the purpose 
of the federation is to preserve the self-government rights of all its constituent members, then 
negative consequences for the remaining polity are a self-inflicted harm that cannot trump a right 
to secede.12  
This raises the question of how to assess cases where the constitution is not fully federal 
(as in the UK and Spain) or where a territory has been granted special autonomy status. The 
answer is that the same principle must also apply to these cases. Where a particular territory is 
integrated into a (non-federal) state based on an agreement that its autonomy will be protected by 
the constitution of that state, it is the violation of this autonomy that potentially legitimates a 
secession claim. Finally, the question may be raised whether a more permissive stance of a 
constitution or central government on secession is legitimate. In the UK, Northern Ireland has 
                                                          
11 I thank David Owen for pushing me to clarify this point. 
12 I thank an anonymous reviewer for this question. 
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been granted an explicit right to secede and realign with the Irish Republic if a majority of the 
citizens of the province vote for this change, whereas the Westminster Parliament granted 
Scotland only a temporary permission, which expired at the end of 2014, to hold a referendum on 
independence (Skoutaris 2017). Nothing I have said above rules out such permissions, which in 
the Northern Irish case is also supported by the duty of the UK to remedy ongoing effects of its 
past colonial rule over Ireland and of partition in 1921. But no general duty to allow for 
unilateral secession can be derived from a few countries creating such a right.  
What about within-state secessions that create new autonomous provinces? My general 
argument in section 3 in favour of territorial stability and democratic diversity implies again a 
presumption against considering these as unilateral rights. However, notice that the diversity 
argument applies in fundamentally different ways to secessions within and from states. Imagine a 
country where a linguistic minority is strongly concentrated within a particular territory but 
where this territory does not have self-governing status because it is merged into a larger 
province dominated by national majority language speakers. In this case, the linguistic minority 
may rightly feel that, in the absence of powers to establish their idiom as the dominant public 
language in their territory, there is a risk that the language will fade away.13 Subdividing the 
territory by permitting secession may in this case preserve linguistic diversity in the 
encompassing polity. If the same territory would instead secede from the larger state and form a 
new country, there would be no more common polity within which this diversity can be 
recognised and accommodated. The goals of accommodating diversity and preserving minority 
cultures can thus be reconciled through redrawing internal territorial boundaries, while the latter 
goal is sacrificed in international secessions.  
                                                          
13 See Laponce’s (1987) argument on why minority languages need territorial powers to survive. 
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The territorial integrity interest of sub-state polities inside a democratic state are weaker 
than those of independent states, which are potentially exposed to hostile interference by other 
states. However, as the above scenario illustrates, the autonomy interests of territorial minorities 
may support either a claim to internal secession or to preservation of territorial integrity against 
central government plans to merge them into a larger territory. The goal is thus not to maximise 
diversity within each sub-state territory, which would rule out creating territories where 
minorities are concentrated, but to preserve diversity as a stable background at the level of the 
encompassing polity. The general principle is to accommodate legitimate claims to territorial 
self-government through subdividing the territory in a way that minimises majority domination.  
There are two risks associated with such accommodation. The first is that creating 
territories where national minorities form a majority will lead to domination of internal 
minorities within these territories (Eisenberg and Spinner-Halev 2005). If an internal minority 
does not itself have claims to territorial self-government, then domination can be avoided only 
by promoting an inclusive public culture and applying liberal constraints on nation-building 
within the minority territory in the same way as in the encompassing state. The second risk is 
that accommodating minorities through multinational federalism or territorial segmentation may 
also empower them to eventually form independent states (Kymlicka 2001, pp. 91-119; Roeder, 
2007, Erk and Anderson 2009). The normative argument points, however, in the opposite 
direction: Depriving minorities of territorial self-government powers potentially justifies their 
claim to external secession while granting them sufficient powers of self-government obliges 
them to respect the territorial integrity of the state. This unfortunate gap between normative 
prescription and empirical prediction can and should be narrowed through constitutional design, 
for example by giving territorial minorities stronger stakes in the encompassing polity through 
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integrating the representatives of territorial minorities into power-sharing institutions at the 
central government level and ensuring that federal institutions such as Constitutional Courts are 
not biased towards the central government.14 
What about secession at the local level? On my account, the democratic purpose of local 
self-government is fundamentally different from that of territorial autonomy for constituent and 
potentially independent territories. It is to provide local residents with public services and an 
infrastructure for their daily lives and economic or cultural activities. As democratic polities 
municipalities must be responsive and accountable to their residents and treat them as equal 
citizens when taking political decisions on such matters. These tasks create an interest in 
territorial integrity that – although it may be considered weaker than that of states or historic 
provinces – once again defeats a presumptive unilateral right of secession.  
Suppose a city government needs to impose a certain level of local taxes in order to 
finance an adequate infrastructure. Residents living in a wealthy suburb bordering on a rural 
municipality with much lower tax rates campaign for secession and realignment with their rural 
neighbours in order to avoid paying taxes for the infrastructure that they would continue to use 
because of the city’s open borders. This example illustrates a general principle that local 
territorial borders should match social patterns of settlement and activities of inhabitants 
(Bauböck 2003). Cities have a legitimate interest in including in their borders wider metropolitan 
regions under a single layer of government and can rightly oppose opportunistic secessions on 
this ground.15 For the same reasons, where a provincial or central government unduly curtails a 
                                                          
14 The absence of such integrating mechanisms in the Spanish case may have contributed to the escalation 
of Catalan autonomy claims towards secessionism. 
15 By contrast, plebiscitarian secession theories must regard such instrumental reasons as legitimate. 
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city’s attempts to develop its urban infrastructure and public services, the city might attempt to 
secede by campaigning for an administrative upgrade into an autonomous province.16  
 
 
6. Procedural Legitimacy Tests: recognition claims 
 
The purpose of the substantive tests outlined above is not to determine conclusively whether 
secession is legitimate. This is only possible for exit from a confederation or union of states. In 
all other contexts, the substantive tests yield different degrees of presumptive legitimacy for 
claims to territorial integrity or secession. The task of the procedural tests is then to specify how 
such necessarily vague assessments could be translated into a set of procedures that are likely to 
produce legitimate outcomes. The search for pure procedural legitimacy17 is, however, futile, as 
the substantive criteria discussed in the previous section determine what procedures we should 
be looking for in each type of polity.  
Of the four relations of recognition introduced in section 2, candidacy recognition is the 
only condition that applies universally to secession claims at all levels and in the same way. If 
political leaders, parties or governments call for secession of a territory, they are making a 
representative claim (Saward 2010) to speak on behalf of a constituency residing in the territory. 
Such a claim is spurious if it is not supported by the constituency. Its representativeness may also 
be contested if it is made on behalf of only a part of the resident population (e.g., a titular 
                                                          
16 A proposal to turn Toronto into a federal province has been on the political agenda since the 1970s. 
See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proposal_for_the_Province_of_Toronto. 
17 Pure procedural legitimacy would be similar to Rawls’ concept of pure procedural justice, which refers 
to situations ‘in which there is no independent criterion for the right result: instead there is a correct or 
fair procedure such that the outcome is likewise correct of fair whatever it is, provided that the procedure 
has been properly followed’ (Rawls 1971, p.86). 
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nationality) and involves non-residents (a diaspora). Democratic procedures are therefore 
required in order to establish that the claim is representative.  
A second consideration provides the answer as to what kind of procedure is required. 
Secession, even if we understand it as an upgrading of the self-governing status of a territory, 
creates a new demos. It follows that a representative claim cannot be recognised in the same way 
as most other political decisions in representative democracies, which is by majority vote in a 
legislative assembly emerging from free and fair elections. If the decision is about whether a new 
demos will be constituted, then a vote by the representatives of the already constituted demos is 
not sufficient. Only the citizens of the contested territory themselves can provide candidacy 
recognition through a referendum on secession.18  
It is, however, important to clarify that the citizens voting in a secession referendum are 
not necessarily identical with the constitutive demos of a newly formed polity. First, before the 
vote it is impossible to know with certainty which way the decision will go. The composition of 
the demos voting on secession can therefore not be based on the outcome of a decision that is 
still to be taken by the very same demos.19 Second, in case of eventual secession, the final 
borders may be a matter of negotiation with the parent polity. If they are redrawn, they will 
include a constitutive demos that is not identical with the one enfranchised in the referendum. 
Finally, a referendum on secession must not be gerrymandered in order to make the desired 
result more likely, either by including territories where citizens are inclined to vote against 
secession or by excluding those that are likely to be opposed. The upshot of these considerations 
                                                          
18 The dissolution of Czechoslovakia in 1993 based on decisions by the political leaders of the two 
federated republics and ratified by the federal parliament was therefore illegitimate from a democratic 
perspective. This assessment is reinforced by evidence that at the time of separation a majority of citizens 
in both parts of the country would have voted against it (see the sources quoted in Roeder 2007, p.25). 
19 The general point is made by Goodin (2007). For a discussion of the franchise in the Scottish 2014 
referendum see Ziegler et al. (2014). 
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is that a secession referendum must be held in a candidate territory whose borders are already 
well defined and it must involve the same voters who are already recognised as citizens of the 
territory prior to secession or who have a claim to be so recognised (which may include a 
diaspora that has been recently coercively dislocated and may exclude settlers brought recently 
into the territory in violation of the local population’s self-government rights).20 This argument 
provides further support for my initial conceptual claim that secession is an attempted political 
upgrading of an existing territory rather than the voluntary formation of a new political 
association. 
In contrast with candidacy recognition, parental recognition is not a universal 
requirement in the sense of either a duty to grant or a right to withhold recognition. This follows 
straightforwardly from the discussion of substantive legitimacy criteria in the previous section. 
Opportunistic secessions and those that violate the territorial integrity of the parent polity in the 
absence of a sufficiently strong grievance do not have to be recognised by the latter even if they 
are supported by a clear majority of the candidate territory’s citizens. The interesting empirical 
question is what procedures in democratic states make democratic support in the parent territory 
a condition for secession. One such procedure is contained in article 29 of the German 
Constitution, which regulates the redrawing of internal borders between the German Länder. 
Consider a hypothetical scenario where the culturally and historically distinct region of 
Franconia wants to secede from Bavaria and form a new Land. Art. 29 stipulates first a 
substantive test of taking into consideration criteria such as regional cohesion, historic and 
cultural identity, economic and administrative efficiency, which an initiative for a new Land 
                                                          
20 For a more extensive discussion see Stjepanovic and Tierny (2018, in this issue). See also Arrighi 
(2018, in this issue) for an empirical explanation of why secessionists in Scotland and Catalonia, in spite 




Franconia might plausibly meet. A referendum on a bill about the change of status and borders 
would have to be held in all of Bavaria. The decision is for secession of Franconia if 1/4 of the 
electorate participate in the vote and if there are either simple majorities in favour in both 
Franconia and in all of Bavaria or a 2/3 majority for secession in Franconia and no 2/3 majority 
against it in all of Bavaria. This complex procedure combines candidacy with parental 
recognition, giving the parent polity a qualified veto power over secession.  
I do not know of any similar procedure for a constitutional right to international 
secession. In the recent Catalan secession crisis, however, Spanish Prime Minister Mariano 
Rajoy stated that a referendum on the independence of Catalonia would be legitimate only if it 
were held in all of Spain. This stance contrasts with the well-known opinion of the Canadian 
Supreme Court,21 which concluded that a clear majority on a clear question in a referendum held 
in the province of Quebec alone would trigger a duty of the federal government to enter 
negotiations with the province that might – although not necessarily so – result in independence. 
It also contrasts with the British Parliament granting Scotland a temporary right to hold a 
referendum, in which a pro-independence vote would have been politically binding. These three 
different stances have been sometimes misinterpreted as indicating a lack of consensus across 
democratic states on whether there is a unilateral right to secession without parental recognition. 
This is clearly wrong, as the Canadian Supreme Court unambiguously states that there is no such 
right in the first place. The differences are instead over the question of how parental recognition 
must be expressed in order to make secession legitimate: in the same coin of democratic majority 
support as for candidacy recognition (Spain), through legislative ex ante permission for a 
referendum in the candidate territory (UK), or as the result of executive negotiations after a pro-
independence vote in that territory (Canada)? Given this variation of democratic practices, it is 
                                                          
21 Reference Re Secession of Quebec Sup. Ct. of Canada 2 S.C.R. 217. 37 I.L.M. 1340 (1998) 
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unpromising to postulate a general procedure for parental recognition that ought to be followed 
in all cases. However, the substantive principles proposed in section 5 for external secession 
provide at least some indications for what conditions are impermissible. Where a central 
government has persistently violated the self-governing rights of a territory it cannot respond to a 
secession threat by insisting that such a decision must be taken by the demos of the 
encompassing polity. The burden is then first on the secessionists to establish that their 
grievances amount to such a violation and, if this can be confirmed, shifts to the central 
government that must offer alternative remedies, such as constitutional reform, if it wants to 
preserve the territorial integrity of the state.  
Moving on to vertical and horizontal recognition, I want to illustrate these again with an 
empirical example. The creation of the canton Jura followed a procedure that was quite different 
from the one foreseen by the German Constitution. After a partly militant struggle by Jurassian 
separatists, three referendums were held in 1974 and 1975 in which mostly Francophone 
municipalities in the northern parts of Canton Berne voted to establish a new canton. The 
decisive condition in this case was not parental recognition by Berne, but vertical recognition by 
the Swiss federal demos, which voted in September 1978 for the new canton Jura that was duly 
admitted into the federation in 1979. Since a fully federal constitution involves not merely 
autonomy of constitutive territories, but also extensive power-sharing in federal institutions, 
regional-level secession amounts to an ‘internal enlargement’ that affects the federation as a 
whole and its institutions. The Swiss formula for federal referendums requires a double majority 
among all enfranchised federal citizens as well as in a majority of cantons, which implies thus a 
further threshold of horizontal recognition in the procedure of legitimising internal secession.  
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The Swiss example contrasts with the Indian Constitution’s rule for the formation of new 
states (Article 3), which requires only vertical recognition through decision by the Indian 
Parliament after taking the view of the affected state legislature into account, but without testing 
either candidacy or horizontal recognition, which makes the change of internal borders a rather 
arbitrary power of the central state.   
Some authors have applied the idea of internal enlargement to the EU arguing that an 
independent Scotland or Catalonia would not have to apply for accession under article 49, but 
could instead continue to be included as EU territories through a Treaty revision according to 
article 48.22 As correctly stated by Requejo and Nagel (2017) this is only plausible if the EU is 
regarded as a federation in the making. According to the multilevel approach presented in this 
paper, such a view misunderstands, however, the nature of the EU, which is a voluntary 
association of independent states. From this latter perspective, Brexit as well as potential 
decisions for Scottish or Catalan independence put these territories outside the Union. The fact 
that EU law had been deeply entrenched in all these polities while they were inside should 
facilitate negotiations about terms of separation in the former case and of accession in the latter, 
but it does not affect the question of membership status itself. 
Let me finally consider briefly the horizontal recognition of newly formed states in the 
international system. While international law does not acknowledge a right of self-determination 
for nations that are not already constituted as states or for territorial majorities that want to 
secede (Cassese 1995), past practice has mostly been that newly formed states are eventually 
recognised if they exercise effective sovereignty. The redrawing of international borders has 
been, however, strongly constrained through the principle of uti possidetis iuris (Ratner 1996), 
which is often condemned as entrenching borders designed by colonial powers or authoritarian 
                                                          
22 See various contributions in Closa and Vintila (2015). 
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predecessor regimes. From the perspective defended in this article, the latter critique is 
misguided. Conceptually, as well as normatively, secessions should be understood as claims to 
upgrade the status of existing territorial polities, rather than as a redrawing of borders according 
to criteria such as ethnicity, language or race. By contrast, the critique of a criterion of effective 
sovereignty is largely supported. Ideally, states should form their own judgments on whether an 
international secession is legitimate because of a persistent prior violation of territorial self-
government rights. The problem is that foreign states are generally not in a good position to 
make such judgments. Moreover, international recognition of new states by existing ones is the 
outcome of a largely uncoordinated process of decisions that are inevitably clouded by domestic 
concerns about the latter’s own restive minorities or foreign policy concerns about how 
recognition will affect their relations with the parent state. In the absence of a global political 
authority that would turn all international secessions into internal ones, democratic states ought 
to promote a stronger role of international jurisprudence and courts, such as the International 
Court of Justice, which in turn should aim for a progressive evolution of international law on 
self-determination and state recognition (Buchanan 2004).  
 
7. Conclusions  
In this paper I have connected a conceptual claim to a normative one. The conceptual claim is 
that secession should always be understood as an (attempted) change of the status or affiliation 
of a territory within a multilevel constellation of polities. The normative claim is that the 
legitimacy of secession depends on whether it can be justified on the basis of the different 
purposes of democratic polities at local, federated, independent and union levels and whether it 
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meets reasonable procedural requirements for recognition inside the candidate territory, by the 
parent and encompassing polity and by other horizontally aligned polities in the constellation.  
My conclusion is that candidacy recognition through a referendum in the territory that 
tries to break away is a universal condition for democratic secession, but that this necessary 
condition is a sufficient one (qualified by a readiness to negotiate fair terms of separation) only 
for member states of a confederation or union of independent countries. In all other cases, the 
parent polity’s interest in territorial integrity creates a presumption against a right to secede. 
However, the thresholds for relevant grievances, and the procedural conditions for secession vary 
strongly across territorial levels. Secession from independent states is substantially legitimate if 
and only if territorial self-government rights of the candidate polity have been persistently 
violated and there is no alternative remedy. A desire to match territorial with cultural boundaries 
cannot justify international secession, because the underlying goal of sorting nationally diverse 
populations into separate polities is pernicious for democracy. By contrast, internal secessions 
within states may be motivated by attempts to match cultural and social boundaries if this helps 
to prevent domination of minorities or to unify metropolitan areas under a single government.  
I have illustrated different degrees of procedural permissiveness towards international 
and internal secession, quoting rules applied in Canada, Spain, UK, Germany, Switzerland and 
India. The task of normative theory is not to be overly prescriptive by picking out best and worst 
practices, but to use such examples instead for reaching a reflective equilibrium in which the 
initially chosen principles meet the test of real democratic contexts, while being also refined and 
modified as a result of the encounter.  
Let me conclude on a speculative note. The multilevel theory of secession that I have 
sketched is premised on the assumption that all polities have clearly demarcated territorial 
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jurisdictions. We can imagine alternative or future worlds in which this is no longer the case. 
Territory could lose importance if either large majorities of people are constantly on the move 
without ever settling down for good (Bauböck 2017: 12-18) or if new digital technologies allow 
for the democratic constitution of governments and the provision of government services on a 
non-territorial basis (Orgad and Bauböck 2018). In such a fictional world, democratic polities 
would have to adopt more permissive attitudes towards secession. Political associations might 
become much more like voluntary associations in civil society, with the effect of increased 
homogeneity within and increased heterogeneity between polities. Inside such non-territorial 
polities there might be fewer conflicts that call for democratic resolution, but there would be a 
much stronger potential for conflicts between them and no political authority that has a 
democratic mandate from citizens to regulate these. I imagine this world as a dystopia in which 
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